The pro-competitive effect of imports from China: an analysis of firm-level price data by Matteo Bugamelli et al.
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)
The pro-competitive effect of imports from China: 
an analysis of firm-level price data



















0   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
The pro-competitive effect of imports from China: 
an analysis of firm-level price data
by Matteo Bugamelli, Silvia Fabiani and Enrico Sette
Number 737 - January 2010The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working 
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:  Patrizio Pagano, Alfonso Rosolia, Ugo Albertazzi, Andrea Neri,   
Giulio  Nicoletti,  Paolo  Pinotti,  Enrico  Sette,  Marco  Taboga,  Pietro  Tommasino, 
Fabrizio Venditti.
Editorial Assistants:  Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.THE PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF IMPORTS FROM CHINA:  
AN ANALYSIS OF FIRM-LEVEL PRICE DATA  
 
by Matteo Bugamelli, Silvia Fabiani* and Enrico* Sette*  
 
Abstract 
The entry of China into world markets has been one of the strongest recent shocks to 
world trade and advanced countries' industrial sectors. This is particularly true for Italy 
where labour-intensive, low-technology production represents a large share of output. Using 
Italian manufacturing firm-level data on output prices over the period 1990-2006, we test 
whether increased import competition from China has affected firms' pricing strategies 
causing a reduction in the dynamics of prices and markups. After controlling for other price 
determinants (demand and cost, domestic competition and import penetration), we find that 
this is indeed the case. Comparing China's share of world exports to Italy with China's total 
world export market share proves the causal nature of the relationship we find. Inspired by 
and in line with recent advances in the literature on international trade, we also show that the 
price effects of Chinese competitive pressures are stronger in less technologically advanced 
sectors and, within these sectors, on smaller firms.  
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations    1 Introduction1
Does product competition from China a⁄ect ￿rms￿pricing strategies in advanced countries?
More precisely, does increased penetration of Chinese products cause a reduction of ￿rms￿
(relative) prices and markups? Are these e⁄ects stronger in less technologically advanced
sectors where price competition is prevalent? And are they stronger for smaller ￿rms, likely
less capable of improving product quality?
We answer positively to all these questions using a unique micro-level dataset of Italian
manufacturing ￿rms over the period 1990-2006. We ￿nd that increases in the share of
Chinese products in total Italian imports have a negative causal impact on ￿rms￿price
dynamics. This result is obtained estimating a reduced-form model of ￿rm-level pricing that
accounts for demand and cost shocks, for domestic competition and import penetration, for
￿rms￿size and productivity and for time and sector e⁄ects. The size of the impact of the
Chinese import share is non-negligible: ￿rms operating in a sector where such a share is 10
per cent higher tend to contain their output price growth by 0.3-0.4 percentage points per
year.
According to the recent international trade literature, changes in prices and markups
play a crucial role for enhanced foreign competition to increase aggregate productivity.
The story goes as follows: stronger foreign competition forces domestic ￿rms to reduce
prices and pro￿ts until "weaker￿￿rms get closer to their break-even and eventually exit the
market, triggering a process of market shares reallocation that leads to sectoral productivity
improvements. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the ￿rst empirical test of the very
early stage of this chain of events.
Importantly, this paper is among the few based on data on ￿rm-level prices, instead
of sectoral prices or ￿rm-level unit values. By focusing directly on ￿rms￿prices, we do
not need to rely on possibly imprecise accounting ￿gures on price-cost margins nor to
adopt estimation methods such as the one proposed by Hall (1988) and implemented by
various authors2. Moreover, the use of disaggregated data allows us to control and test for
heterogeneity across both sectors and ￿rms.
The advantages of concentrating on China are at least threefold. First, China represents
a very important shock to external trade, one that is also temporally well-de￿ned. Its
increasing role in world trade has been impressive and has occurred during the time horizon
1We wish to thank Andrew Bernard, Andrea Brandolini, Sergio de Nardis, Giorgio Gobbi, John Halti-
wanger, Saul Lach, Francesca Lotti, Francesco Nucci, Giuseppe Parigi, John Romalis, Fabiano Schivardi and
participants at seminars at EEA2009, EIEF, ETSG2008, LMDG2008, ITSG2009, University of Perugia and
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance for their comments. We also thank Angela Gattulli for invaluable
research assistance. We are solely responsible for all errors. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Bank of Italy.
2On the drawbacks of the two approaches, see Tybout (2001).
5covered by our ￿rm-level data. According to the manufacturing trade data we use in the
paper, China￿ s total world export market share increased from 2.3 per cent in 1990 to 11.2
in 2005; the corresponding share in world exports to Italy increased from 0.6 to 6.2. China￿ s
potential growth in world trade is still very high. Second, competitive pressures exerted by
Chinese products on world markets are considered to be mostly price-based, thus making
the investigation of ￿rms￿price reactions particularly relevant. Finally, since both Chinese
exports and Italian production are concentrated in less technologically advanced sectors (so
called "traditional" sectors: textile, apparel, leather, footwear, furniture), the relationship
we study is one of great relevance.
Moreover, we address potential endogeneity biases by instrumenting the Chinese share in
world exports to Italy in a given industry - our variable of interest - with the corresponding
share in total world exports. This identi￿cation strategy aims at isolating push factors
determining China￿ s exports related with industrial development and trade policy in that
country, thereby excluding that the evolution of productivity and competitiveness of Italian
￿rms feeds back into China￿ s export patterns to Italy.
Various extensions strenghten our con￿dence about the causal relationship we identify.
As we deal with Chinese competitive pressures in Italy, we consistenly ￿nd that the e⁄ect is
stronger for ￿rms that sell their products mostly on the domestic market. We also exploit
the theoretical predictions brought forward by the international trade literature and show
that Chinese competition exerts stronger pressures on smaller ￿rms belonging to sectors,
like textile, apparel and leather, where price competition is relatively more important. Due
to the presence of large ￿xed costs in R&D, innovation and marketing activities and to
relatively more binding ￿nancial constraints, smaller ￿rms are less capable of competing
through non-price factors (e.g., product quality upgrading, technological innovation).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the background litera-
ture and discuss our contribution to it. Section 3 presents the estimating equation. Section
4 describes the ￿rm-level and the trade data we combine in the empirical analysis. The
results for the baseline speci￿cation are in Section 5, while extensions are in Section 6.
Concluding remarks are left to the last section.
2 Background literature
The pro-competitive e⁄ect of trade is theoretically well-grounded. In the seminal paper by
Krugman (1979) trade integration raises the number of product varieties available, thereby
increasing competition. In the most recent models of international trade with heterogeneous
￿rms (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano,
2008), stronger foreign competition and increased imports are followed by price reductions
6related to both decreases in markups and increases in average ￿rm productivity (through
reallocation e⁄ects).
The empirical support is growing. For developing countries, one-o⁄ trade liberalization
events are shown to be followed by an intense resource reallocation that brings aggregate
productivity growth and reduction in pro￿t margins (Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994;
Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Tybout, 2001; Pavcnik, 2002). These latter studies share the
advantage of relying on a relatively exogenous, as a trade liberalization can be, increase in
trade openness.
With regard to advanced countries, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a) use US plant-
level manufacturing data and show that a reduction of inbound trade costs is indeed posi-
tively associated with industry- and ￿rm-level productivity growth, the probability of plant
death, the probability of entry of new exporters, and export growth by incumbent ex-
porters. Firm heterogeneity plays the predicted role: the impact on plant death is smaller
for more productive plants. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006b) perform a similar exercise
using as an external trade shock the sectoral exposure to increasing imports from low-wage
countries. They ￿nd again that such a measure is positively (negatively) correlated with
the probability of plant death (employment growth). Again, these e⁄ects are weaker for
highly productive and relatively more capital intensive plants; moreover, plants tend to
move away from industries more exposed to low-wage country competition to more capital
intensive productions. Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009) use a panel of manufacturing industries
for seven European countries during the 1990s and ￿nd signi￿cant pro-competitive e⁄ects
of trade openness; in particular, they show that increased imports raise industry produc-
tivity, reduce industry markups, (temporarily) slow down (production) prices. Auer and
Fischer (2008) ￿nd that US industrial sectors more exposed to competition from emerging
countries record higher productivity growth, as well as lower price in￿ ation. Abraham,
Konings and Vanormelingen (2009) ￿nd that import competition from low wage countries
reduces markups and workers￿bargaining power among Belgium ￿rms. Bloom, Draca and
Van Reenen (2008) use ￿rm-level data from 11 EU countries and show that Chinese import
competition reduces employment growth and increases, though to a lesser extent, propensity
to adopt ICT and plant exit.
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, it focuses directly on
prices and, contrary to Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009) and Auer and Fischer (2008), it does
so using ￿rm-level data. This approach somehow complements Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2006a, 2006b) and Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2008) by providing evidence on the
price e⁄ects of foreign competition at the ￿rm-level. As they do, we investigate the existence
and extent of heterogeneity both across industries, testing whether changes in prices and
markups are negatively correlated with the intensity of Chinese competition, and within
7industries, testing whether the response to increased competition is heterogeneous across
￿rms as predicted by theoretical models. Alike Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009), our estimates
refer to a short-run equilibrium, one that does not admit changes in ￿rms￿ production
location.
Second, like Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006b), we precisely characterize foreign com-
petition by focusing on increased import penetration by low-wage countries. We adopt an
even more restrictive view and focus only on China, whose increasing role is undoubtedly
the most relevant change occurred in world trade over the last decades.
Third, by relying on a reduced-form pricing equation that controls for all possible de-
terminants of costs and markups, we estimate the impact of import competition on ￿rms￿
markups without making use of indirect estimation methods as Abraham, Konings and
Vanormelingen (2009).
This paper grazes an issue that has been the object of a vast and quite controversial
debate over the last few years (before the 2007-09 international crisis), concerning the
relationship between globalization and the worldwide very subdued in￿ ation pattern, despite
buoyant economic activity (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988; Rogo⁄, 2003; Bean, 2006). We
do not aim at contributing to this debate, as we focus on the e⁄ect that trade integration,
through lower import prices and stronger competitive pressures, exerts on relative prices
(Pain, Koske and Sollie, 2006, among others)3.
3 Empirical Speci￿cation
As our goal is to isolate the e⁄ect of import competition from China on ￿rms￿pricing strate-
gies, we need to set up an empirical speci￿cation that accounts for all price determinants:
demand, costs, productivity and market power. In a standard model with imperfect com-
petition a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization yields an optimal price that is a markup over marginal
costs (i.e., pi;t = ￿i;t ￿ ci;t), that, after taking logs and ￿rst-di⁄erencing, becomes:
￿logpi;t= ￿log￿i;t+￿logci;t
While we observe prices at the ￿rm level, we need to proxy for markups and unit costs.
To this aim, we take stock of the rich industrial organization literature on markups (Do-
mowitz, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992; for Italy, Marchetti,
2001) and de￿ne markups as a function of a time-invariant sector component related to
3On the basis of the same dataset we use here, Gaiotti (2009) argues that globalization has not induced
a weakening of the link between prices and domestic economic activity.
8technology and market structure, the level of demand (cyclical markups) (DEM) and com-
petition. We make a distinction between domestic (DCOMP) and foreign competition,
and we further break down the latter into Italy￿ s import penetration (IMPEN) and the
share of China in world exports to Italy (CHINA_IT). In line with industrial organization
models and related empirical evidence, we also assume markups to be increasing in ￿rm
size (SIZE). Notationally, we obtain4:
￿log￿i;t = ￿o+￿￿logDEMi;t+￿0￿logDCOMPs;t+￿1￿logIMPENs;t+ (1)
￿2￿logCHINA_ITs;t+￿￿logSIZEi;t+"i;t
where s indexes the 2-digit NACE sector a ￿rm i belongs to. It is worth highlighting,
as we discuss below, that we use a ￿rm-level measure of demand, proxied by changes in
the capacity utilization rate. Competition, both domestic and foreign, is measured at the
sectoral level.
We then model changes in unit costs as follows:
￿logci;t= ￿1+￿￿logWi;t+￿￿logICi;t + ￿￿logTFPi;t+ t+ui;t (2)
where W is the unit wage, IC is the unit cost of intermediate inputs, TFP is total factor
productivity. Year dummies  t capture changes in costs that are common to all ￿rms.
Importantly, IC controls for the e⁄ect of cheaper intermediate inputs, including those from
China, on costs and prices (Abraham, Konings and Vanormelingen, 2009).
When we combine equations (1) and (2) to derive our base empirical speci￿cation, we
take one-period lags of all the regressors. This choice is substantiated by the empirical
evidence arising from a large number of recent studies on ￿rms￿ pricing policies in the
euro area, based on both survey and quantitative micro data (see Fabiani et al., 2007 and
references therein). According to these studies, ￿rms￿prices do not react immediately to
cost or demand shocks; both in Italy and in other European countries ￿rms adjust prices
on average once a year.
Given that the ￿rm-level output price change recorded in our database is expressed in
percentage terms, in the estimating equation we de￿ne all regressors as percentage changes.
Notationally:
4The time-invariant sector components a⁄ecting the level of markups are swept away by ￿rst di⁄erencing.
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￿2￿CHINA_ITs;t￿1+￿￿SIZEi;t￿1+￿￿Wi;t￿1+
￿￿ICi;t￿1 + ￿￿TFPi;t￿1+ t + ￿i;t
We always cluster standard errors by sector, as we aim at identifying the e⁄ect of
a sectoral variable (￿CHINA_IT) in a ￿rm-level dataset. In order to account for the
possibility that changes in costs are characterized by sectoral trends - induced, for example,
by technological change - we also show an estimate of equation (3) that includes a full set
of sector dummies (19 sectors from the 2-digit NACE-Rev.1 classi￿cation).
3.1 Causality
The key parameter of interest in equation (3) is ￿2. This is the coe¢ cient of the percentage
change in the Chinese share of world exports to Italy, which in our interpretation measures
the e⁄ect of a change in competitive pressures from China (through imports) on Italian
￿rms￿price variations.
Even after controlling for other determinants of ￿rm-level price dynamics, the distrib-
ution of the changes in the Chinese share across sectors could still be correlated with the
error term, thus inducing a bias in the estimate of ￿2. The main concern is reverse causal-
ity: Chinese products may gain larger market shares in those sectors where Italian ￿rms are
expected to raise prices more (or decrease them less). Hence, we would expect an upward
bias in ￿2. A second concern is related to the potential omission, among our set of controls,
of time-varying sectoral factors that a⁄ect at the same time both output price dynamics
and the Chinese share in Italy.
We address these two issues by instrumenting the variable ￿CHINA_IT with the
equivalent ￿gure computed on total world export ￿ ows, that is with the percentage change in
China￿ s total world export share computed excluding exports to Italy (￿CHINA_WRL).
Since Italy￿ s weight over total world imports and exports is relatively small (less than 4
per cent), we are con￿dent that ￿CHINA_WRL is not a⁄ected by developments in the
Italian economy. It is rather the result of push factors related to industrial development
and trade policies in China. If any demand or competition e⁄ects in￿ uence China￿ s world
exports, these are very likely localized in the Asian region and in the US, which overall
absorbed two thirds of Chinese total exports in 1998 and still 65 per cent in 20065. This is
true even in sectors where Italian ￿rms hold a comparative advantage.
5From a complementary perspective, the EU15 market, where Italian ￿rms sell more than 50 per cent of
their exported products, accounts for less than 15 per cent of China￿ s exports.
10Having argued that ￿CHINA_WRL evolves indipendently of Italian developments,
we need to account for the possibility that some unobserved time-varying sectoral factors
could still bias our estimates. Such factors must have an impact on trade at the worldwide
level in order to simultaneously a⁄ect both China￿ s world share and ￿rms￿pricing strategies
in Italy. For instance, coordinated changes in tari⁄s and other import restrictions may
indeed a⁄ect both Chinese exports and Italian prices. To the extent that such international
factors eventually a⁄ect world trade sectoral developments, we can investigate whether
the latter are correlated with the evolution of the Chinese world share. We ￿nd that the
correlation (equal to -0.025) between CHINA_WRL and sectoral world trade (that is, the
denominator of CHINA_WRL) is statistically not signi￿cant, supporting the hypothesis
that our instrument is not driven by time-varying factors a⁄ecting world trade. In other
words, such unobserved sectoral factors are unlikely to be a source of bias.
A ￿nal issue is the possible weakness of our instrument. In our view, this is not a real
concern. As shown in the last panel of Figure 1, the evolution of CHINA_WRL and
that of CHINA_IT (the market share levels) for the manufacturing industry as a whole
(excluding tobacco, petroleum and computing) are quite close. The importance of China
has been growing since the beginning of the ￿ 90s in both markets (world and Italy) with
a slight acceleration after about 2000. The other panels of Figure 1 show that the world
￿gure traces the Italian one quite well even at the sectoral level, with a correlation coe¢ cient
above 0.9. Most importantly, in our base regression the F-statistic of excluded instruments
is well above the rule of thumb threshold of 10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997)
to avoid weak instrument concerns.
For the same reasons outlined above, reverse causality could also plague the estimated
coe¢ cient of import penetration. We empirically deal with this potential problem by in-
strumenting import penetration in Italy at the sectoral level with the corresponding ￿gure
computed for the US. The results, presented in section 5.2, indicate that the estimated bias
is not large. Moreover, an Hausman test comparing an IV model with only ￿CHINA_IT
instrumented to an IV model with both ￿CHINA_IT and ￿IMPEN instrumented does
not reject the null hypothesis that the estimate from the former model is consistent. Hence,
we choose to show all the robustness exercises and extensions using the IV model where
only ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented.
4 The Data
We combine data from various sources and merge ￿rm-level information with sectoral trade
￿gures. Firm-level data, available from 1982 through 2006, are obtained from the Bank
of Italy￿ s Survey on Investment in Manufacturing Firms (SIM) and the Company Account
11Data Service (CADS). Sectoral trade data, available from 1990 through 2005, are from the
World Trade Analyzer (WTA) database developed by Canada Trade Statistics. In both data
sources, we focus only on 2-digits Nace Rev.1 manufacturing sectors and exclude three sec-
tors: ￿Tobacco products￿ , which is in Italy mostly government-owned, ￿Petroleum & Coal
Products￿ , whose performance is too sensitive to international oil prices, and ￿Computing
and o¢ ce equipment￿ , which is too thin (almost inexistent) in Italy.
Since we estimate a lagged di⁄erenced model, in the regression the dependent variable
(i.e., the annual rate of change in ￿rms￿output prices) ranges from 1992 to 2006, and the
regressors from 1991 to 2005. After excluding observations below the 1st and above the
99th percentile of the distributions of the growth rate of each ￿rm-level regressor, we are
left with about 6,300 observations.
4.1 Firm-level data
SIM is an open panel (managed by the Bank of Italy) of about 1,200 ￿rms representative
of Italian manufacturing ￿rms with at least 50 employees. Given the strict, personal rela-
tionship between o¢ cials of the Bank of Italy and the single ￿rms, the intense process of
data revision carried out by statisticians of the Bank of Italy and the special e⁄or to keep
information as closely comparable across time as possible, SIM turns out to be a very high
quality dataset. SIM￿ s questionnaires, submitted to companies at the beginning of each
calendar year and relative to the previous year￿ s data, collect a wide range of information:
year of foundation, nationality, location, sector of activity, ownership structure, employment
(yearly average), investment (realized and planned), sales (domestic and foreign), capacity
utilization rate, indebtdness. Every year the survey is enriched with additional sections
covering speci￿c issues. CADS is the organization in charge of gathering and managing
￿rms￿account data in Italy. It was established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of
Italy, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and a pool of leading banks with the aim of
collecting and sharing information on borrowers. Balance sheets are re-classi￿ed in order
to reduce the dependence on accounting conventions used by each ￿rm to record income
￿gures and asset values.
Descriptive statistics on the merged CADS-SIM dataset are presented in Tables 1 and
2. The number of ￿rms is not constant over time, due to the fact that SIM is an open panel
and to the requirement we impose that each ￿rm participates to the survey for at least three
years in a row. The sectoral composition is broadly representative of the specialization of
the Italian economy, with most ￿rms operating in machinery, textile, apparel and chemical
products. The sample tends to be biased towards relatively large and old ￿rms re￿ ecting
the fact that, as stated above, we observe the balance sheets only of those ￿rms that obtain
12bank loans. All in all, as the ￿rms included in the database are better than average ones
- thus especially able to survive on the market -, our analysis may somehow underestimate
the e⁄ect of Chinese competition.
Importantly, since 1987 the SIM survey has collected quantitative information on ￿rms￿
output price change with respect to the previous year. The price change is expressed in
percentage terms, euro-denominated and averaged across destination markets. It is also
averaged across the di⁄erent products sold by each ￿rm. Given that ￿rms are classi￿ed
according to the sector which the main product belongs to, the last aspect could represent
a problem if ￿rms were selling products falling into di⁄erent 2-digit categories. Fortunately,
as shown by ISAE (2009), this is almost never the case for Italian ￿rms at the 2-digit
disaggregation level.
We use this ￿rm-level average output price change as our dependent variable. Figure
2 shows its distribution across ￿rms by year: the overall average is about 2 per cent, but
there is quite a high degree of variability, both over time and across sectors and ￿rms.
The largest price increases are reported by ￿rms operating in the metal industry and are
concentrated in 2003 and 2004 ￿characterized by sharp rises in raw material prices￿ and
in 1993 and 1995 ￿following devaluation episodes. The largest price cuts are recorded in
the metal industry and in the production of paper and chemical products in 1996. In the
empirical analysis we control for these time and sectoral e⁄ects.
The advantage of working with ￿rm-level price data can be appreciated in Figure 3
that reports the overall (all years) distribution of price changes under three speci￿cations:
raw data, controlling for year ￿xed e⁄ects and controlling for year and sector ￿xed e⁄ects.
Allowing for year and, to a much lesser extent, sector ￿xed e⁄ects helps smooth out some
spikes in the raw data but does not seem to have a large explanatory power. In other words,
there is still a lot of heterogeneity to be exploited within years and sectors, that is, across
￿rms.
The reliability of our ￿rm-level price measure can be assessed by comparing it with its
macroeconomic counterpart, the o¢ cial Producer Price Index (PPI), available since 1996,
computed and published by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Figure 4
shows, for each 2-digit NACE and for the whole manufacturing sector, the PPI (excluding
energy) annual growth rate and the average annual price change computed on the basis of
our ￿rm-level data. It is quite evident that the two measures are highly correlated, despite
the fact that the PPI is a weighted average and refers only to industrial products sold
on the domestic market, whereas SIM price changes reported by ￿rms are simple averages
computed irrespectively of the destination market.
All the regressors at the ￿rm level are constructed from the merged CADS-SIM dataset.
13Firm size (SIZE), measured as the number of employees, is from SIM6. Unit wage (W) is
obtained as the ratio between total labor costs from CADS balance sheets and the number
of employees from SIM. The short-run changes in ￿rm-level demand (￿DEM) are proxied
by changes in the ￿rm￿ s capacity utilization rate from SIM7. The intensity of domestic
competition (DCOMP) is measured by a concentration index (the market share of the
four largest ￿rms in terms of sales), computed on the basis of CADS data at the 3-digit
level. Total factor productivity (TFP) is Bank of Italy￿ s internal computations based
on the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)8 and applied to CADS data on
value added, capital stock, intermediate inputs and labor; it also entails the correction
for imperfect competition proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996) and adapted further to
￿rm-level production function estimation by Melitz (2004)9.
The measure of unit input costs (IC) is computed by dividing the balance sheet ￿gure
on total costs for intermediate inputs (from CADS) by the number of employees (from SIM).
This is not a precise measure of the unit cost of inputs, since the average price of inputs is
multiplied by the ratio between the physical quantity of intermediate inputs and the number
of employees. In other terms, the changes in IC we include in our base regression can be
due either to changes in input prices or to changes in factor (intermediate inputs vs labor)
proportions. This has two important implications. On the one side, we are able to estimate
the e⁄ect of changes in input prices only under the assumption that factor proportions
are ￿xed: this seems somehow reasonable in the short run analysis we conduct. On the
other side, we do not necessarily consider the possible violation of the ￿xed proportions
assumption a drawback of our approach. As we aim at isolating the pro-competitive e⁄ect
of imports from China, we do want to control for the e⁄ect of Chinese imports on input
6As a measure of ￿rm size, we prefer to use employment instead of total sales. Being the product
between output and prices, sales could be positively correlated with prices, even with their changes, simply
because prices appear on both terms. Given the personal relationship between Bank of Italy￿ s o¢ cial and
￿rms￿entrepreneurs and managers, the reliability of the employment ￿gure in SIM is particularly high. Its
correlation with the CADS￿ s ￿gure is close to 95 percent.
7The ￿rm-level rate of capacity utilization is derived as answer to the following question: "What is the
ratio between actual production and the level of production which would be possible by fully using the
available capital goods without changing labor inputs?". The correlation between its annual across-￿rm
average and a standard macro measure of capacity utilization in manufacturing (computed by the Bank of
Italy on the basis of industrial production and ISAE￿ s quarterly surveys) is about 0.8. Gaiotti (2009) shows
that movements in SIM￿ s capacity utilization also track quite well the behavior of the output gap in the
whole economy.
8Along the lines traced by Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proposed to solve the
simultaneity bias stemming from the unobservability of TFP by adding intermediate inputs to the production
function estimation.
9Klette and Griliches (1996) note that a production function estimation where value added is de￿ ated
through a sectoral de￿ ator potentially su⁄ers from an omitted variable bias, where omitted is the di⁄erence
between the sectoral de￿ ator and individual ￿rms￿prices. In an imperfectly competitive world, this di⁄erence
is non-zero. The same authors suggest as a correction to add the sectoral total de￿ ated value added as proxy
for such a di⁄erence.
14prices and on the decision of ￿rms to outsource activities. This is precisely what ￿IC
is doing: it jointly controls for both the dynamics of intermediate inputs prices (possibly
due to cheaper Chinese products) and for ￿rms￿changes in outsourcing strategies (again,
possibly due to cheaper Chinese products).
4.2 Trade data
The main source of our trade data is the World Trade Analyzer developed and managed by
Statistics Canada, which provides clean data on export and import ￿ ows, in current dollars,
for a very large set of countries, disaggregated by destination market and type of product
over the period 1985-2005. The product breakdown corresponds to the 4-digit SITC-Rev.3
classi￿cation. Since ￿rms in the CADS-SIM dataset are classi￿ed according to the NACE-
Rev.1 system, we mapped the SITC-Rev.3 classi￿cation into the 3-digit NACE-Rev.1 using
the concordance tables provided by the United Nations. Due to the limited size of SIM
we then aggregated the 3-digit Nace-Rev.1 trade data at the 2-digit level. This choice has
the advantage that, at this level of product disaggregation, the percentage of multiproduct
￿rms, falling into two or more di⁄erent categories is very low, less than 2 per cent according
to ISAE (2009). On the other hand, we cannot control for the potential relocation of ￿rms
within a 2-digit category. In our case, this might be particularly relevant if ￿rms avoid
Chinese competition by changing their product mix within the same product category: we
will come back to this issue in section 6.
We construct two measures of China￿ s importance in world trade: the Chinese share of
total world exports and the share of Chinese exports in world exports to Italy (CHINA_WRL
and CHINA_IT, respectively). While the latter represents the variable of interest, that
is a sectoral indicator of competitive pressures exerted from China on Italian ￿rms on the
Italian market, the former acts as instrumental variable. We restrict trade data to the
1990-2005 period since data on Chinese exports to Italy display some strange ￿gures during
the ￿ 80s. Table 3 reports the actual sectoral ￿gures for 1992, 1995, 2000 and 2005. In tra-
ditional sectors the Chinese share of world exports to Italy has grown signi￿cantly, getting
close to 15 per cent in 2005; the same share computed over total world exports has reached
even higher values, especially in apparel and leather goods (around 25-30 per cent). Since
2000 the increase has been also very signi￿cant in the other transportation sector, with the
Chinese share of total world exports standing at 23.3 per cent in 2005.
Sectoral import penetration (IMPEN) in Italy is derived combining production series
from the OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis with export and imports from
the OECD STAN bilateral trade database; ￿gures are recorded at the 2-digit Nace-Rev.1
classi￿cation and available until 2006. In the same way we measure import penetration
15in the U.S. (IMPEN_US), that we use as instrument for IMPEN. The two measures
are reported in Table 4. As of 2005, in Italy it is highest in motor vehicles, TV and
communication equipment, chemical goods and iron and steel, lowest in metal products,
publishing and products from non-metal minerals. The pattern is di⁄erent for the U.S.
which is a much closer market for motor vehicles but very import-dependent in leather
products and apparel. IMPEN, whose correlation with IMPEN_US is positive and
equal to 0.34, displays instead a negative correlation (of about -0.15) with CHINA_IT.
5 Empirical Results
Before turning to estimates of equation (3), we assess whether the raw data provide any
preliminary descriptive evidence suggesting that the Chinese export share in Italy has a
bearing on Italian ￿rms￿pricing strategies. We split the sample into two groups according
to the size of the average sectoral annual change in the Chinese share over the period
examined (1990-2005), using the median as the cuto⁄ point. Simple unconditional means
indicate that indeed the average annual price increase in the group of sectors that recorded
a larger increase in competitive pressures from China is equal to 1.7 per cent, against 2.5
per cent in the other group.
Another way to examine the data is to check whether the relationship we are looking
for holds already in a simple regression framework. Table 5 reports the coe¢ cients of an
OLS regression of the ￿rm-level price change on the lagged change in the Chinese share
of total world exports to Italy. The results display a statistically signi￿cant relationship
only when we control for year ￿xed e⁄ects (columns 2 and 4); in such cases, the R-squared
rises signi￿cantly, too. The contribution of sector ￿xed e⁄ects, despite being statistically
signi￿cant, is very limited.
5.1 Base regression
We now focus on the estimates of equation (3). The ￿rst two columns of Table 6 report
OLS estimates without (column 1) and with (column 2) sector ￿xed e⁄ects. The estimated
co¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT is always negative: it is not statistically signi￿cant when we
control for sector ￿xed e⁄ects.
As discussed in Section 3.1, if the entry of Chinese products on the Italian market is,
ceteris paribus, more intense in sectors where Italian ￿rms are less price competitive, i.e.
where domestic prices increase relatively more, then the OLS estimate of the parameter
￿2 is upward-biased. We therefore turn to IV estimation, using China￿ s total world export
market share as instrument. The results, reported in the same Table, are again displayed
without (column 3) and with sector ￿xed e⁄ects (column 4). It is worth emphasizing that
16the F-statistics of excluded instruments, reported in the bottom panel of the Table, is always
above the rule of thumb value of 10, to say that weak instrument is not a concern.
In the IV estimations the coe¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT becomes highly statistically sig-
ni￿cant and much smaller, thereby con￿rming an upward bias in the OLS estimates. The
pro-competitive e⁄ect of imports from China on ￿rms￿output prices amounts to about
0.03-0.035, to say that a 10 per cent increase in the Chinese share brings about a 0.3/0.35
percentage points reduction of price dynamics. It is quite a sizeable e⁄ect as the average
price change across years and sectors in our sample is 2 per cent.
Turning to the other regressors, OLS and IV speci￿cations yield very similar results.
As expected, import penetration has a negative e⁄ect on price growth, too. The estimated
e⁄ect, though, is much smaller than the one of ￿CHINA_IT: according to the IV estima-
tion, a 10 per cent increase in import penetration reduces price dynamics by 0.06 percentage
points, less than a ￿fth the e⁄ect of China.
A size increase (￿SIZE) raises market power and therefore the ￿rm￿ s ability to charge,
ceteris paribus, higher prices. According to Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), a positive correla-
tion between ￿rm size and output prices might also follow from the fact that larger ￿rms are
those producing better quality goods sold at higher prices. The dynamics of intermediate
input costs has also a positive impact on price changes.
The remaining coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant. In particular, the price elasticity to labor
costs (￿W) is not only statistically not signi￿cant but also very small. This result is quite
consistent with previous empirical evidence showing that the ￿ner the disaggregation, the
lower the estimated response of prices to changes in wages (Bils and Chang, 2000). Similar
results, based on Italian ￿rm-level data, are obtained by Rosolia and Venditti (2009) using
wages10 and by Gaiotti and Secchi (2006) and Gaiotti (2009) using contractual wages.
Moreover, according to ￿rm surveys conducted recently in a wide number of European
countries (in the context of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network), prices are on average
adjusted more frequently than wages and only around 15 per cent of ￿rms acknowledge a
strong relationship between the timing of price changes and that of wage changes (Druant
et al., 2009). In particular, in the case of Italy, the low frequency of wage changes and the
scarce variability across ￿rms as compared to other countries is largely explained by the
wide coverage of the highly centralized collective bargaining system.
As to the e⁄ect of TFP, the statistically insigni￿cant coe¢ cient may re￿ ect the fact that
the sign of the relationship between price and TFP changes is a priori ambiguous: as clearly
pointed out by Melitz (2004), it captures both increases in productivity (with a negative
10If we regress ￿rm-level price changes only on wage dynamics, we obtain a signi￿cant coe¢ cient of about
0.03, which is very close to the one estimated by Rosolia and Venditti (2009) over a longer time period. The
coe¢ cient becomes much lower (and statistical insigni￿cant) once we control for time dummies.
17e⁄ect on prices) and quality upgrades (with a positive e⁄ect).
In the remainder of the paper we present robustness tests and extensions to the base
estimation. To simplify the presentation of results, hereafter we focus only on the IV
estimates, presented as in Table 6 under the two alternative speci￿cations: with and without
sector ￿xed e⁄ects11.
5.2 Robustness
Import penetration may be endogenous for the same reasons as the Chinese share of Italian
imports: import penetration may be simply more intense in those sectors where Italian
￿rms are less price competitive. To deal with the related upward bias, we instrument the
change in import penetration in sector S in Italy with the corresponding ￿gure in the U.S.
The chosen instrument is not a⁄ected by Italian ￿rms￿pricing strategies, but it is very likely
correlated with import penetration in Italy as one can assume that developed countries have
roughly similar demand patterns. Results, reported in Table 7, are very similar to those
obtained in the base regression. The coe¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT remains unchanged at
-0.035. Moreover, an Hausman test that compares an IV model with only ￿CHINA_IT
instrumented to an IV model with both ￿CHINA_IT and ￿IMPEN instrumented does
not reject the null hypothesis that the estimate from the former model is consistent.
A second exercise deals with the presence of a possible survivorship bias. Since ￿rms that
are not able to compress margins enough may decide, or be forced, to exit the market, we
could be overestimating the pro-competitive e⁄ect of ￿CHINA_IT. We address this issue
using information on the ￿rms￿history, contained in CADS, that allows to explicitly control
for exit from the market. In particular, we include among the regressors a dummy variable
EXIT 12, constructed in two alternative ways. In the ￿rst, more restrictive, de￿nition,
EXIT takes value 1 if the ￿rm is liquidated or go bankrupt after exiting the sample and
0 otherwise. In the second, EXIT takes value 1 also if the ￿rm is subsequently acquired
by another ￿rm. Results are displayed in Table 8: in both cases (columns 1-2 for the ￿rst
de￿nition, and 3-4 for the second) all the results are unchanged and the coe¢ cient of EXIT
is never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Table 9 shows the robustness of our estimates to outliers. The ￿rst two columns present
the estimates of equation (3) after eliminating sector-year cells with less than 20 ￿rms.
Again, the previous results, now based on 6,145 observations, fully hold. The last two
columns refer to the results obtained estimating equation (3) on the sub-period 1996-2006.
11All the results hold unchanged in a speci￿cation with sector ￿xed e⁄ects but no clustering of standard
errors.
12EXIT can be interpreted as the hazard rate in a Heckman selection model. The di⁄erence is that here
the probability of exit is perfectly observed and it does not need to be estimated.
18The exclusion of the years 1993-95 is motivated by the large devaluation of the Italian Lira
occurred in 1992, which provided a stronger shield to those sectors more exposed to foreign
competition. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that price changes were especially large in that period.
The estimates con￿rm the intuition: the coe¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT increases, in absolute
terms, by 50 per cent, to -0.053.
Other robustness checks carried out but not reported in the text are the following. To
allow for price dynamics that are geographically heterogeneous, we controlled for ￿rm￿ s lo-
cation including macro-area dummies (North-West, North-East, Center and South): results
are unchanged and the dummies are overall not signi￿cant. We tested for the potential
persistence in ￿rm￿ s price dynamics including the lagged price change as an additional
regressor: again, results are stable and the lagged dependent variable is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero (p-value 0.13). We also estimated the baseline model with ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ects, so as to capture ￿rm-speci￿c time trends, and allowing for clustering of standard
errors at the ￿rm level. In both cases, results hold through.
6 Extensions
The results presented so far show that the growth in the Chinese share of Italian imports af-
fects the pricing strategies of Italian ￿rms. They are remarkably robust across speci￿cations
and subsamples. We now propose some extensions aimed at improving our understanding
of the mechanisms through which Chinese competitive pressures in￿ uence prices in Italy
and further increasing the credibility of our results. For this, we take advantage of the
availability of sector- and ￿rm-level characteristics13.
6.1 Domestic vs exporting ￿rms
Since we measure Chinese competitive pressures through Italian imports, the e⁄ect we
estimate should be stronger on ￿rms￿prices charged on the domestic market. In the absence
of information on prices broken down by destination, we perform two indirect tests (always
IV): i) we exclude from the sample ￿rms exporting more than 30 per cent of their total sales
at (t-1); ii) we estimate a weighted version of equation (3) where the ￿rm-level weights are
constructed as the share of domestic sales in total sales. In both cases, we expect a lower
coe¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT (higher in absolute value)
Results are reported in Table 10. As shown in columns 1 and 2, which refer to the ￿rst
13Despite the absence of any evident structural break in the expansion of China into world markets (￿g. 1),
we tested whether the coe¢ cient of ￿CHINA_IT is larger after China￿ s entry into WTO in 2001 or after
1998 when the European Union signi￿cantly reduced its import tari⁄s. In both cases we ￿nd no signi￿cant
di⁄erences. The expiration of the Multi￿ber Agreement in 2005 is beyond the reach of our data.
19experiment, the estimated impact of imports from China on price changes rises to -0.057,
from -0.035 in the base regression with sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. This is to say that a 10 per cent
increase in the Chinese share of Italian imports reduces price dynamics by 0.6 percentage
points, 60 per cent more than what reported in Table 6. Consistently, the same happens
to the coe¢ cient of ￿IMPEN (here not instrumented) that is now equal to -0.009, more
than double, in absolute terms, the one estimated in the base regression.
The weighted estimates are presented in columns 3 and 4. Again as expected, the
(negative) impact of foreign competition is larger. This holds for both the coe¢ cient of
￿CHINA_IT and that of ￿IMPEN. In absolute terms and as compared to Table 6, the
former rises by 30 per cent, the latter by 50 per cent.
All in all, our conjecture is con￿rmed: ￿rms more reliant on domestic revenues are more
a⁄ected in their pricing strategies by the competition exerted by Chinese products in Italy.
6.2 Heterogeneity across sectors
Is the price e⁄ect of China￿ s competitive pressures di⁄erent across sectors? Providing an
answer to this question represents not only a way of testing the predictions of theoretical
models but also a further indirect test on the plausibility of the causal relationship we are
identifying. Since we focus on price behavior, a dimension we might want to explore is
the type of competition prevailing within a given sector. To simplify things, we test the
following hypothesis: are competitive pressures from cheap Chinese products stronger in
those sectors where the competition game is played more on price than on non-price factors
(e.g., product quality, innovative technology)?
To this aim, we need to split sectors according to a criterion that mimics the prevailing
type of competition. We follow Romalis (2004) and rank sectors according to skill and
R&D intensity. Both measures are computed from 1998 U.S. data to avoid endogeneity
problems. The identifying assumption, similar in spirit to Rajan and Zingales (1998), is
that the ranking of sectors in terms of skill and R&D intensity is the same in Italy as in
the U.S.
The indicator of skill intensity we use is taken from the March 2008 release of the EU
KLEMS database and is computed as the number of hours worked by high-skilled persons
￿de￿ned as those with at least a college degree￿ as a share of total hours worked. The basic
idea we exploit here is that high-skilled workers are those employed in activites like R&D,
marketing research, new product development, brand management that overall contribute
to raise product quality, at least as perceived by consumers. The R&D intensity indicator
is a direct proxy for innovative inputs; measured as R&D expenditure over value added, it
is taken from the OECD STAN database.
20As shown in Table 11, the distribution of sectors according to R&D intensity is more
polarized than the one for skill intensity; however, the two measures are highly correlated
(the correlation coe¢ cient is around 0.8). Firms producing ￿medical, precision and optical
instruments￿ , ￿radio, television and communication equipment￿and ￿other transportation
equipment￿ spend a relatively higher fraction of their value added on R&D and employ
relatively more skilled workers. Traditional sectors (e.g., food, textiles, apparel, leather and
wood products) are instead characterized by low values of the two indicators. Importantly,
we do not want to claim that product quality does not matter in the traditional sectors (in
fact, thinking of the worldwide famous "Made in Italy" apparel and footwear industry, one
would easily say the opposite), but that climbing the quality ladder for Chinese competitors
is relatively easier in such sectors that in the high R&D and skill intensive ones. We come
back on this in section 6.3 when we allow for heterogeneous product quality across ￿rms.
For the empirical analysis, we construct two time-invariant dummy variables: LOWSK
is equal to 1 for ￿rms belonging to sectors with skill intensity below the median value
of 0.14 and LOWRD is equal to 1 for ￿rms belonging to sectors with R&D intensity
below the median value of 0.01. We then include these dummies into equation (3) both as
autonomous regressors and interacted with ￿CHINA_IT (and with ￿CHINA_WLR in
the instrument). We expect the coe¢ cient of the interaction term to be negative, that is to
say that Chinese price competition puts relatively more pressures on low-skill (low R&D)
activities.
Results are reported in Table 12. The ￿rst two columns (as usual without and with sector
￿xed e⁄ects) refer to skill intensity; the latter two to R&D intensity. As expected, we ￿nd
that the stepped-up competition of Chinese provenance is indeed stronger in sectors that
are less active in research and development activities. This same intuition is not con￿rmed
when controlling for skill intensity of the labor force at the sector level. In both cases, the
use of continuous instead of dummy variables for R&D and skill intensity does not bring
any signi￿cant evidence.
6.3 Heterogeneity across ￿rms
Reasonably, the ability to compete is also heterogeneous across ￿rms within sectors. Taking
stock of di⁄erent theoretical and empirical contributions, ￿rm size seems to be the crucial
variable to be used. Being a structural indicator, its use as interaction with ￿CHINA_IT
also helps minimize endogeneity problems. Many arguments can be posed in support of the
idea that Chinese competitive pressures have a stronger impact on smaller ￿rms.
The possibility that large ￿rms might undertake more R&D is widely accepted (Schum-
peter, 1934; Griliches, 1998). Due to ￿xed cost, many R&D projects are pro￿table if their
21outcomes can be used in a su¢ ciently large production scale. Moreover, R&D itself might
be characterized by economies of scale and scope: once innovation is developed, large and
diversi￿ed ￿rms have better opportunities to exploit it. The same arguments apply to the
so-called non-techological innovation related to various commercial activities, like advertis-
ing, marketing and distribution (Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza, 2008).
Moreover, large ￿rms have presumably a greater capacity to ￿nance innovation thanks to
larger internal cash ￿ ow and better access to external funding. There is plentiful evidence,
for Italy too, that small ￿rms are more likely to be ￿nancially constrained (see Hubbard,
1998 for a survey of the literature). Angelini and Generale (2008) provide evidence that
Italian small ￿rms are more likely to su⁄er from ￿nancing constraints than large ￿rms. If
smaller ￿rms are less able to raise external ￿nance, they are less likely to have the resources
to diversify their products, either by investing in R&D and improve product quality, or by
investing in advertising and create a recognized brand.
Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) model the so-called quality complementarity hypothesis
stating that input quality and ￿rm productivity are complementary in generating output
quality. Embedding this hypothesis into Melitz (2003) model, they predict a positive cor-
relation between ￿rm size on one side, and input and output quality on the other. The
empirical ￿ndings, based on output and input price data at the Colombian plant-level, are
consistent with the theoretical predictions. In the speci￿c case of Italy, we have some direct
evidence of a positive relationship between ￿rm size and output quality. Using self-reported
information on product quality collected by SIM in 200414, we ￿nd that the median ￿rm
size is equal to about 160 among ￿rms declaring to produce high quality products, against
a lower 130-140 for the others. This di⁄erence is also statistically signi￿cant as proved by
a regression of a dummy variable equal to 1 for high quality products (and 0 otherwise) on
the log of employees15.
The implications of these di⁄erent literatures for our setup are quite clear: lower quality,
less innovative and technologically advanced goods produced by smaller and ￿nancially
constrained ￿rms are more likely to be crowded out by cheaper Chinese products. In
the empirical analysis we do not aim at providing any horse race among these di⁄erent
arguments, but simply focus on ￿rm size. Moreover, we notice that, in theory, ￿rm size
might be crucial both in high and low R&D (skill) intensity industries, considering that both
groups contains di⁄erentiated manufacturing products: this is surely the case for Italian
14Sampled ￿rms were asked to assess which of the following categories their products belong to: "price
convenient", "fair quality/price ratio", "medium-high quality", "high quality". Due to the very few responses
and, admittedly, high chances of collecting upwardly-biased responses, we did not use this data in the
econometric analysis.
15Similarly, Verhoogen (2008) ￿nds that ISO 9000 certi￿cation, an international production standard
related to product quality, is more likely among larger Mexican plants.
22traditional sectors. It becomes an empirical issue to see whether and in which sectors ￿rm
size is indeed relevant.
We construct a dummy variable SMALL that is equal to 1 for ￿rms with less than
80 employees, which is the median ￿rm size in the sample. We include it as an au-
tonomous regressor and interacted with ￿CHINA_IT, LOWSK (LOWRD), and with
￿CHINA_IT￿LOWSK (LOWRD). The results are shown in Table 1316. When we focus
on skill intensity (columns 1 and 2), we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of Chinese competition is indeed
stronger for smaller ￿rms in low-skill activities. Quantitatively, given a 10 per cent increase
in the Chinese share, the average e⁄ect on price dynamics equal to 0.30-0.35 percentage
points (in absolute value) goes up to 1.15-1.2 for those ￿rms. The result is qualitatively
analogous when sectors are split by R&D intensity (columns 3 and 4); quantitatively, the
e⁄ect on small and low R&D ￿rms is even larger (around 1.7).
One limitation of this exercise is that the two measures of skill and R&D intensity
might not appropriately rank sectors according to the degree of price competition. We
therefore perform a di⁄erent exercise and search for heterogeneous e⁄ects by ￿rm size only
within those sectors where competition is more likely price-based, i.e., textile, apparel,
leather goods, and furniture. The results, reported in the last two columns of the Table,
fully con￿rm our intuition: only smaller ￿rms are forced to react to competitive pressures
exerted by imports from China by lowering price and markup dynamics. For these ￿rms,
a 10 per cent increase in China￿ s import share compresses output price dynamics by 1.2
percentage points. The coe¢ cient of ￿W is now positive and signi￿cant. Compared with
the base estimation, this result indicates that the e⁄ect of wages on prices is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero only in labor intensive sectors.
7 Conclusions
Recent advances in the international trade literature have brought forward the idea that ￿rm
heterogeneity is a crucial ingredient to understand the functioning of international markets.
A large number of empirical papers have therefore put the ￿rm at the center of the analysis
and shown that di⁄erent reactions of ￿rms to trade liberalizations or to increased foreign
competition are the trigger to industry-level adjustments in productivity.
In the chain of events that goes from enhanced competition to increases in aggregate
productivity a key role is played by prices and markups. Stronger foreign competition
indeed forces price and pro￿t reductions, and, as a consequence, ￿weaker￿￿rms get closer
to their break-even until they exit. This provokes a cross-￿rms reallocation of market shares
16We do not report estimation of the models with ￿CHINA_IT interacted only with SMALL since
they do not give signi￿cant results
23that eventually leads to sectoral productivity improvements.
In line with these models, we showed that the growing competitive pressures exerted
by Chinese products on an advanced economy like Italy has contributed to soften, ceteris
paribus, output prices and markups. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst
empirical test, based on ￿rm-level data, of such a prediction. The impact we estimate is
non-negligible: a 10 per cent increase in the Chinese share of Italian imports reduces price
dynamics by 0.3-0.4 percentage points per year (the average annual in￿ ation rate being
equal to 2 per cent). Moreover, the e⁄ect of China is signi￿cantly larger than that of
average import penetration.
When we explicitly exploit sectoral and ￿rm heterogeneity, we con￿rm other theoreti-
cal predictions. Being Chinese competition mostly price-based, we ￿nd indeed a stronger
e⁄ect among low-technology sectors such as textile, apparel, leather goods, furniture. The
e⁄ect is also more severe for smaller ￿rms, that are presumably less able to escape China￿ s
competition by upgrading the quality of their products.
In our view, the estimated negative impact of China￿ s exports to Italy on Italian ￿rms￿
price dynamics extends to markups, since the empirical speci￿cation controls for all the
determinants of both unit costs (wage, cost of inputs, TFP) and markups (sector-level
demand, sector-level domestic competition, sector-level average foreign competition and,
within sector, ￿rm-level market power), except the composition (China vs others) of Italian
imports.
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28Table 1: Descriptive statistics, sampled ￿rms
1990 1995 2000 2005
Number of employees 869 654 471 283
Number of employees (median) 206 226 192 131
age 44 43 40 39
sales (million of euros) 105.1 129.1 111.7 79.2
value added per worker (thousands of euros) 41.2 51.4 56.9 60.3
per capita wage (thousands of euros) 27.4 30.1 32.5 36.7
export/sales (percentage, only exporters) 31.1 38.2 39.0 42.1




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 5: Univariate regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿CHINA_IT -0.001 -0.005*** -0.000 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Year FE no yes no yes
Sector FE no no yes yes
Observations 6345 6345 6345 6345
R2 0.000 0.091 0.010 0.101
P-value test F(all year FE = 0) 0.000 0.000
P-value test F(all sector FE = 0) 0.000 0.000
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1
classi￿cation) are reported in brackets below the coe¢ cients.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
37Table 6: Base Regression
OLS IV First stage IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿CHINA_IT -0.005* -0.004 -0.030*** -0.035*** ￿CHINA_WRL 1.00*** 0.761***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) (0.190) (0.191)
￿IMPEN -0.004* -0.005*** -0.004 -0.006** -0.060 -0.053
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.053) (0.041)
￿CONC -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.018 0.011
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.051) (0.057)
￿DEM 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.028)
￿SIZE 0.180** 0.188** 0.183*** 0.180*** -0.097 -0.348
(0.072) (0.073) (0.068) (0.070) (0.441) (0.362)
￿IC 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** -.015 -.054
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.069) (0.073)
￿W 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.135 0.157
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.103) (0.111)
￿TFP 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.099 -0.077
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.063) (0.049)
Constant 0.021*** -0.006 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.244 0.869***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.206) (0.189)
Sector FE no yes no yes no yes
F- stat - - 27.82 15.94
R2 0.099 0.147
Observations 6345 6345 6345 6345 6345 6345
Notes: In columns 1 and 2 OLS estimates of equation 3; in columns 3 and 4 IV estimates of equation 3 where
￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL; in columns 5 and 6 ￿rst stage IV regressions. Robust
standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in brack-
ets below the coe¢ cients. In column 2 and 4 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The explanatory
variables are described in sections 3 and 4. F-stat refers to the F-statistics of excluded instruments from the
￿rst stage estimation of ￿CHINA_IT on ￿CHINA_WRL and all the explanatory variables included in
the second stage.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.




















Sector FE no yes
Observations 6345 6345
Notes: IV estimates of equation 3 where ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL and
￿IMPEN by ￿IMPEN_US. Robust standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace
Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in brackets below the coe¢ cients. In column 2 the regression includes
sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The explanatory variables are described in sections 3 and 4
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
39Table 8: Firms￿exit
liquidation or bankruptcy liquidation, bankruptcy
or acquisition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿CHINA_IT -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.035***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
￿IMPEN -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
￿CONC -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
￿DEM 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
￿SIZE 0.180*** 0.178** 0.184*** 0.183***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.068)
￿IC 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
￿W 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.009
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
￿TFP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EXIT -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sector FE no yes no yes
Observations 6345 6345 6345 6345
Notes: IV estimates of equation 3 where ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL. Robust
standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in
brackets below the coe¢ cients. In column 2 and 4 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The
explanatory variables are described in sections 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 2 the dummy EXIT is equal
to 1 if the ￿rm is liquidated or go bankrupt after exiting the sample and 0 otherwise; in columns 3 and 4 it
is equal to 1 also for ￿rms that is subsequently acquired by another ￿rm.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
40Table 9: Outliers
>20 ￿rms 1996-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿CHINA_IT -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.044** -0.053*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.030)
￿IMPEN -0.003 -0.005** -0.003 -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
￿CONC -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
￿DEM 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
￿SIZE 0.183*** 0.182** 0.237*** 0.234***
(0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.076)
￿IC 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.014** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
￿W 0.004 0.007 0.026** 0.031**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
￿TFP 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.063***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.017)
Sector FE no yes no yes
Observations 6145 6145 5076 5076
Notes: IV estimates of equation 3 where ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL. Robust
standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in
brackets below the coe¢ cients. In column 2 and 4 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The
explanatory variables are described in sections 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 2 we exclude sector-year cells with
less than 20 ￿rms; in columns 3 and 4 the equation is estimated on the subperiod 1996-2006.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
41Table 10: Domestic vs exporting ￿rms
exports<30% weighted regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿CHINA_IT -0.042*** -0.057*** -0.036*** -0.045***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)
￿IMPEN -0.009** -0.009** -0.006** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
￿CONC -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
￿DEM 0.010 0.013 0.005 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
￿SIZE 0.070 0.099 0.162** 0.167**
(0.090) (0.095) (0.075) (0.079)
￿IC 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
￿W 0.022 0.032 0.014 0.020
(0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015)
￿TFP -0.006 -0.004 -0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.053*** 0.061***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Sector FE no yes no yes
Observations 2905 2905 6045 6045
Notes: IV estimates of equation 3 where ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL. Robust
standard errors clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in
brackets below the coe¢ cients. In columns 2 and 4 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The
explanatory variables are described in sections 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 2 we exclude ￿rms that at (t-1)
have exported more than 30 per cent of their total sales; in columns 3 and 4 the equation is estimated
weighting observations by the share of domestic out of total sales.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
42Table 11: RD and skill intensity, US 1998
Sector (NACE -Rev.1 code in parenthesis) R&D Skill
intensity intensity
Food products and beverages (15) 0.01 0.16
Textiles (17) 0.01 0.10
Wearing apparel, dressing (18) 0.01 0.14
Leather, leather products and footwear (19) 0.01 0.09
Wood and products of wood and cork (20) 0.01 0.08
Pulp, paper and paper products (21) 0.02 0.17
Printing, publishing and reproduction (22) 0.02 0.34
Chemicals and chemical products (24) 0.14 0.41
Rubber and plastics products (25) 0.03 0.15
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 0.02 0.14
Basic metals (27) 0.02 0.14
Fabricated metal products (28) 0.02 0.12
Machinery, n.e.c. (29) 0.06 0.16
Electrical machinery (31) 0.12 0.21
Radio, television and communication equipment (32) 0.22 0.36
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) 0.36 0.38
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 0.13 0.20
Other transport equipment (35) 0.24 0.33
Manufacturing n.e.c., including furniture (36) - 0.16
Source: EU KLEMS, OECD STAN, Year 1998. RD and skill intensity are de￿ned in sections 6.2
43Table 12: Sector heterogeneity
LOWSK LOWRD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿CHINA_IT -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
￿CHINA_IT*SECT 0.012 0.012 -0.035* -0.040*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021)
SECT 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.029***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
￿IMPEN -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
￿CONC -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
￿DEM 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
￿SIZE 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.189***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
￿IC 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
￿W 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.010
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
￿TFP 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Sector FE no yes no yes
Observations 6345 6345 6089 6089
Notes: IV estimates where ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL. Robust standard errors
clustered at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in brackets below the
coe¢ cients. In columns 2 and 4 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The explanatory variables are
described in sections 3 and 4. The variable SECT is equal to LOWSK in columns 1 and 2 and to LOWRD
in columns 3 and 4. LOWSK is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to 1 for ￿rms belonging to sectors
with skill intensity below the median value of 0.14; LOWRD is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to 1
for ￿rms belonging to sectors with R&D intensity below the median value of 0.04. More details on skill and
R&D intensity are provided in section 6.2.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
44Table 13: Firm and sector heterogeneity
LOWSK LOWRD restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿CHINA_IT -0.031*** -0.034** -0.032*** -0.033** 0.004 -0.000
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.044) (0.044)
￿CHINA_IT*SECT 0.005 0.004 -0.022 -0.027
(0.021) (0.026) (0.059) (0.058)
￿CHINA_IT*SMALL 0.013 0.007 0.040 0.038 -0.116** -0.118**
(0.032) (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.047)
￿CHINA_IT*SECT*SMALL -0.090** -0.079* -0.139** -0.137**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.060) (0.059)
SECT 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.038**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016)
SMALL -0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.010 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
SMALL*SECT 0.004 0.001 0.017* 0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
￿IMPEN -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.038 0.026
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.024) (0.021)
￿CONC 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.017** -0.016**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
￿DEM 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
￿SIZE 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.299*** 0.268**
(0.071) (0.073) (0.075) (0.077) (0.102) (0.114)
￿IC 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
￿W -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.040*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
￿TFP 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 6345 6345 6089 6089 1382 1382
Notes: IV estimates. ￿CHINA_IT is instrumented by ￿CHINA_WRL. Robust standard errors clustered
at the sectoral level (2 digits of the Nace Rev.1 classi￿cation) are reported in brackets below the coe¢ cients.
In columns 2, 4 and 6 the regressions include sectoral ￿xed e⁄ects. The explanatory variables are described
in sections 3 and 4. SMALL is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ￿rms with less than 80 employees at (t-1). For
the variable SECT see the note to Table 12.The restricted sample includes textile, apparel, leather products,
other manufacturing.
*** identi￿es signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient at 1 per cent; ** identi￿es signi￿cance at 5 per cent, * identi￿es
signi￿cance at 10 per cent.
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